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Abstract 
In witnessing the 2013general election and the installation of a new government entrusted 
with a remarkable majority in vote, the people of Pakistan and many international observers 
thought that the time for major change had finally come. Especially the country’s neglected 
and repressed areas, like North Waziristan, which is part of Pakistan’s Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA),were hoping for significant improvement of their socio-political and 
economic conditions. However, after two years in power, it seems more and more obvious 
that the current administration of Nawaz Sharif did not intend to change the patterns of 
Islamabad’s decision-making in any significant policy area. Today, the country’s political 
arena is still determined by the unchallenged supreme role of the army, the lack of political 
will and capacities of civilians to implement any noteworthy reform measures, endemic 
corruption, and the ongoing dominance of the Punjab province and its establishment leading 
to the consequent sidelining of the smaller territorial entities. This entrenched negative reality 
is closely linked with a repressive approach of the centre towards the regional periphery, 
which is deeply entrenched within the mindset of the national elite. The latest example for the 
continuation of the elite’s offensive policies is the so called ‘social agreement’ for the people 
of FATA`s North Waziristan, which were forced out by a major counter-terrorist military 
operation. In order to have the permission to turn back home, the internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) had to pledge loyalty and allegiance to the national government and ensure the area’s 
future security. The discriminating character of this agreement shows that Islamabad does not 
have the political determination to change its pattern of decision-making, which ensures their 
economic and political prerogatives at the expense of the smaller provinces and their people. 
Therefore, the establishment avoids any form of a balanced mechanism of sharing power and 
national wealth in order to protect its partisan interests. 
 
Initial Conditions - Continuation of unfortunate British colonial legacies in FATA 
After observing much adulation in the aftermath of smooth general elections in 2013, 
entailing the first regular transfer of power from one civilian government to another, and a 
subsequent more or less functional parliament, one cannot help but sense the repetition of 
history with regards to Pakistan’s political arena. More concretely, it seems obvious that the 
latest enthusiasm of the country’s electorate and the domestic and international media hype 
about a potential ‘new democratic impetus ‘did not initiate any noticeable change in the 
mindset of the civilian and military authorities. The way how the protests against the current 
government after taking office were orchestrated by non-democratic forces or the enactment 
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of the 21st constitutional amendment -manifesting the strongest, formal (constitutional) 
political role of the army in politics ever-are just some indicators forcing independent analysts 
to reassess the willingness of the country’s elite to promote democracy at all. This becomes 
even more obvious when scrutinizing the latest development in the context of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), an area which continues to be a place for human tragedy, 
symbolizing the inherent defects of Pakistan’s political setup. 
 
A former gateway for foreign invasions from western-central Asia as well as a frontline not 
only during the ‘Great Game’ of imperial powers played out in the 19thcentury but also in the 
following conflict during the cold war between Soviet-occupied-Afghanistan and US-allied-
Pakistan, and today a major battle field in the ‘global war against terror’, Pakistan’s border 
region FATA marks a historical battleground. As such, it is not surprising that this troubled 
region and its people developed and maintained unique social structures. Consequently, 
‘outside powers’, in trying to keep this area in check, responded in an extraordinary way to 
exercise influence. This finds its most visible expression with far-reaching consequences in 
the establishment of a restrictive, elite-guided political-administrative system, supported by a 
complex ‘draconian’ set of laws, the so-called Frontier Crimes Regulation 
(FCR).Furthermore, it produced not only a style of governance, which neglects the notion of 
(liberal) democracy but also a political culture that successfully undermined any substantial 
processes of including the common people in participatory, political decision-making 
processes. In brief, the people of North Waziristan (including the rest of FATA) don't enjoy 
the same rights as other Pakistanis. Today critics claim that instead of empowering the 
common people, traditional elites and reactionary hierarchical structures have become even 
more deeply embedded within processes of inter-elite negotiations. Additionally, the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism and Jihadism tremendously enforced the suppression of the tribal 
population and has lead to further socio-economic decline of the FATA region. 
 
Hampered by unfavourable socio-economic and political-administrative factors 
To be able to contextualize such claims one has to shed more light on the region under 
discussion with its socio-economic and political-administrative determinants. The FATA 
region is strategically located between the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, the Durand Line 
(named after British civil servant Sir Mortimer Durand), in the West, the Pakistani province 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, formerly known as North-West-Frontier Province) in the 
North and East, and Balochistan in the South. Administratively, FATA is divided into two 
                                                                                                                                                                         FOCUS                                                                                                  
 
 
territorial entities: a conglomerate of seven Agencies and six areas which are known as 
Frontier Regions (FR). The FR, namely Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, 
Peshawar and Tank, are transition or buffer areas between the Agencies of FATA and the so- 
called adjunct ‘settled areas/districts’ of KPK. The Agencies are namely Bajour, Khyber, 
Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, North and South Waziristan. 
 
The acronym FATA –the Federally Administered Tribal Areas– already reveals two 
unequivocal and significant hints: First, regarding the social, ethnic composition of the 
respective population -tribes, primarily Pashtun ones. Second, the fact that the tribesmen and 
their territories are under direct control of a central, national authority. Approximately a dozen 
major tribes live in the FATA, consisting of numerous sub-tribes divided into clans. If one 
takes the sub-divisions into account, there are around 400 tribes. The total population in this 
region is around 4 million; most of them residing in rural areas, leading to a degree of 
urbanization less than 3%, which is extremely low taking the more than 27.000 square metres 
(over 36% of KPW) and the insignificance of the agricultural sector into account. It is 
important to mention that FATA suffers more or less from the worst socio-economic 
conditions of entire Pakistan. Despite the fact that the area is rich in natural resources 
including minerals, coal and other deposits, no intensive efforts have been made to utilize 
them for development of the area. As a result, Pakistan’s so called ‘tribal belt’ is marked by 
an extremely insufficient infrastructure, ineffective (or non existent) industry, inadequate 
medical care, and an extraordinary lack of job opportunities for the inhabitants, which has 
lead to the establishment of  a flourishing informal shadow economy of smuggling  weapons 
and drugs. This, in return, is further deteriorating the already poor security situation, and 
much-needed business and investment activities are avoiding FATA by moving to the ‘settled 
districts’ and other parts of KPK (which is also partly encouraged by the authorities). 
Therefore, engaging with the Taliban and other Jihadists for financial purposes is viewed by 
some tribal people as one of the few options available. The fact that about 60% of the tribal 
population are live below the poverty line combined with a literacy rate below 18% (which is 
only half of the average in the entire KPK province) fosters and simplifies the recruiting 
process for the Jihadists. 
 
To summarize, the situation in FATA today is doubtless a consequence of a mixture of 
different factors: its chequered history and peculiar culture, colonial legacies, especially the 
unique administrative and political status, as well as post-independence poor governance by 
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the central government. In this context, one should mention that Pakistan’s establishment is 
making no secret out of ‘inheriting’, and continuing the British political-administrative system 
of the ‘divide and rule’, in the FATA.  
 
Being an neglected ‘internal colony’: Repressive national elite behaviour 
Generally one can state, that a very important element of the (British) colonial predecessor, 
which one could call the strategy of ‘carrots and sticks’, was somewhat lost in translation or 
misinterpreted. Pakistan, driven by its security paradigm, which was and is rooted in an 
enduring (paranoid) anxiety, generally prefers to use the ‘stick’, meaning it is looking for a 
military instead of a political solution in areas affected by militants and violent conflicts. 
Having FATA in mind, this means that Islamabad’s security forces use coercive means 
against the tribesmen because of supporting cross-border militancy and terrorism.  
 
The carrot is however not part of the grand scheme. The establishment in Islamabad (as usual) 
has forgotten to implement benign strategies or policies towards its ‘tribal citizens’, which are 
perceived by significant elements of the establishment as fractious, undisciplined, primitive, 
and unable to maintain order. Instead, as already indicated above, for decades virtually no 
developmental activities have been undertaken and envisaged reforms have not or only 
rudimentarily been implemented. One prominent example is the FATA Local Government 
Regulation (LGR) 2012 passed by the national government. Meant to calm the situation and 
bring the FATA a bid to stand at par with other areas by restructuring the inhibiting colonial 
system of governance and the introduction of participative, democratic elements, this reform 
evoked grave concern. In this context, a harsh law imposed in 2011, known as Regulation in 
Aid of Civil Power, gained significance, since it gave tremendous power to the security forces 
to tackle several offences against law and order. However, these regulations gave legal cover 
to the armed forces for unlawful acts (like dubious, unauthorised detentions) committed 
during the military operations. It does not come by surprise that this led to a further alienation 
of the local people, especially since the punishable offences have been already dealt with in 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
 
Another root cause for grievances is that the president of Pakistan directly administers the 
FATA through the governor of KPK and his appointed political agents (PA’s) in the Agencies 
(the FR were headed by District Coordination Officer/DCO of the adjacent settled district) 
who are actually in charge of the decision-making. But it is interesting to note, that besides 
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the fact that PA’s were representing the supreme authority, they were never able to simply 
order something themselves without provoking (violent) resistance. It was always a common 
understanding that a political outcome has to be negotiated between the state and the tribes. 
Therefore, the PA’s are empowered to coerce tribesmen through bribes and threats or granting 
and holding back national resources. However, unsurprisingly nothing happens in the area 
without coordination and in accordance with the local leadership. In sum, the grip of any 
outside rule in the region has never been strong or unchallenged. In order to tackle this 
problem, Pakistan continued, with minor modifications, the colonial oppressive arrangement, 
which narrowed down the decision-making process only to a chosen few stakeholders: the 
Pakistan government represented by the PA’s and the so called Maliks which were identified 
among the tribal elders and/or chieftains.  
 
This not only bestows much autonomy upon the tribesmen but also strengthens the Maliks’ 
position towards their own people, disturbing the traditional system of authority of the 
Pashtuns. Given the sense for equality, egalitarian within the Pashtun tribal society flanked by 
the concept of Pashtunwali (tribal code of honour and behaviour), traditionally the Maliks 
were seen as primus inter pares (the first among equals) but not as supreme leaders. This 
creates an understanding of leadership which is different from other tribal societies in 
Pakistan, like in Baluchistan were basically the tribal chiefs (Sardars) are able to claim greater 
power. But the further entrenchment of the colonial system of ‘divide and rule with proxies’ 
deepened the growing alliance between the outside forces, now represented through 
Pakistan’s administrative officials, and the Maliks as the selected and privileged 
representatives of all tribesmen. In result, the common people in FATA not only increasingly 
lost  the access to political participation but also became more dependent on the tribal 
leadership represented by the Maliks, who benefitted largely from the century-old FCR (first 
introduced in 1901), which constitutes FATA’s judicial system – a hybrid body - that allows 
local customary laws and traditional tribal Jirgas (council of handpicked elders) to prevail in 
tandem with representatives of the central government. This system made sure that all issues 
of significance between the tribes and the Pakistani state were managed through interactions 
between the Maliks and the PA’s (which were backed the Frontier Constabulary Force/Police, 
Levies and Khassadars/tribal militias, Frontier Corps/Army). Additionally it granted the tribes 
substantial autonomy in their own affairs, in which the Maliks, appeared increasingly not only 
as sole interlocutor in state-policy making but also as de facto arbiters in local conflicts as 
well as heads of several councils and Jirgas.  
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In consequence, neither the national legislative can play a role in the respective regional 
affairs nor is FATA a subject to rulings by national or provincial courts, unless Pakistan’s 
president so desires. The fact, that until 1996 members of Parliament for FATA were not 
elected but appointed by the Maliks underpins their extraordinary power.  
 
Deprivation of political rights and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism 
Instead of establishing an empowered local administration in order to include the common 
tribesmen in political decision-making, understood here as a precondition for any democratic 
transition, all reforms and amendments regarding FATA until now, especially the FATA LGR 
2012, turned out to worsen the situation by reinforcing the status quo. In other words, there is 
a lack of political will or lack of capability to change the power structure in FATA, which 
formally rest in the PA’s and informally in the Maliks. Doubtless, the current political status 
of FATA and its inhabitants are against the country’s constitution and are not in line with the 
UN’s general principles and resolutions regarding human rights. The imposed system of 
governance lacks tremendously accountability and transparency. Furthermore, the elected 
representatives still remain powerless because all authority was concentrated within the 
political administration in the name of governor further limited the option for political 
participation. In addition, the restriction in party competition gave Islamist parties and 
religious hardliners a predominant position in form of a monopoly in public opinion making. 
The situation of being deprived of any substantial constitutional, political and civic rights as 
well as any legal protections through the country the judiciary not only made the more rigid 
and conservative but also turned their FATA into a persistent flashpoint. Having this in mind, 
it does not come by surprise that the ‘balance and harmony’ within this autocratic governance 
system was disturbed by the emergence of new, ‘anti-systemic actors’. Most recently, in the 
aftermath of the internationally military actions against the Taliban in Afghanistan, FATA 
become an ideal breeding ground and hub for Taliban and other militants like the Haqqani 
network, Hekmatyar group, or Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Experiencing no credible 
efforts of integrating FATA into the Pakistani state with all necessary constitutional and legal 
ramifications, like granting fundamental rights and a democratic order, the tribal belt will 
remain  a lawless hotbed and sanctuary for Jihadists of all kinds of colour. 
 
In consequence, FATA become a safe haven for Jihadism. However, the militant Islamists not 
only terrorised the whole region but also turned against the local tribesmen enforcing their 
discriminatory, suppressive, and inhuman notions of state and society, rooted in a distorted 
                                                                                                                                                                         FOCUS                                                                                                  
 
 
interpretation of Islam. Furthermore, the Islamists disrupted the traditional social structure, 
with militants taking the place of tribal chiefs and elders by killing many of them. 
Subsequently, Islamabad’s strategy of ruling the area based on its ‘divide and rule’ with 
selected local leadership in order to control the masses of the people does not work anymore 
since it was seriously undermined by the Islamists. But instead of developing a new approach 
through incorporating the common people into the political process by ‘winning the hearts 
and minds’ of them, as well as to strengthen their socio-political, and economic conditions, 
Islamabad reacted in its old traditional pattern by imposing even more stricter laws to give 
legal cover to additional extraordinary armed force. As such, the establishment once again 
showed that it is not willing to share power and resources with the regions despite the fact it 
was agreed on. Here the National Action Plan clearly indicated that Islamabad is or was 
supposed to develop and mainstream the area. However, instead of building a positive image 
of the national government as well empowering the people, the population of North 
Waziristan/FATA was sidelined even more to the advantage of Jihadist outlets. 
 
Military actions and the return of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
Over the last decade, after ignoring the ‘domestic dimension’ of the Islamist threat for a long 
time, Islamabad’s security circles, for years lacking a clear counter-terrorist strategy in FATA, 
was finally engaged in a plethora of military actions with Jihadists and other militants, from, 
half-hearted skirmishes to more complex battle scenarios. But a comprehensive, large-scale 
push against the Jihadists did not take place until 2014. After numerous defeats, few dubious 
victories, and a parade of failed peace treaties, the situation remained out of control and 
Pakistan’s military top brass had to finally to recognize that it is sat  war with its former 
‘brothers-in-arms’ and had to carry out a full-scale major military campaign in FATA, 
foremost in North Waziristan. This military operation, code-named Zarb-e-Azb (which means 
‘Strike of the Prophet's Sword’), was launched in June last year to eradicate all foreign and 
local militants hiding in North Waziristan. Pakistani authorities were claiming that this 
comprehensive and all-inclusive campaign of Pakistan Armed Forces against all kinds of 
militant groups was an extraordinary success, an assessment that is difficult to prove since no 
independent data is available. However, one thing is for sure, this latest armed conflict was a 
humanitarian disaster leading to the displacement of one million people (on 14 July 2014, 
929,859 individuals were registered as internally displaced persons/IDPs), around 18000 
thousand families. 
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After several month of fighting, on 31 March 2015, the IDPs started to return to their 
ancestral homes. In order to receive the permission for their ‘repatriation’, a so called ‘social 
agreement’ was imposed on the tribesmen from Waziristan. The controversial document has 
to be signed by each uprooted family if they want to go back. Basically, regarding official 
statements, this ‘social agreement’ was supposed to ensure the cooperation of the tribal people 
in fighting terrorism. But this document contains only a little social dimension in a positive 
sense (if at all). In contrast, the agreement enshrines some offensive requirements and is 
remarkably discriminating for several reasons: 
First, it presupposes the disloyalty of the tribesmen of North Waziristan towards the state by 
asking them to pledge their allegiance(‘oath of loyalty’) to the constitution of Pakistan. 
 
Second, the local people also have to renew their acceptance of the draconian Frontier Crimes 
Regulation (FCR), which denies the tribal people full citizenship. As such, the agreement 
reinforces the colonial logic and further entrenches the repressive politics of the central 
government towards North Waziristan. Additionally, by making the tribesmen stick to the 
FCR, they have to take on various collective and territorial duties, foremost to ensure peace in 
their area. In other words, the political administration is shirking the responsibilities (and 
consequently also the fault for failures) for maintaining security, law and order towards the 
tribesmen.  
 
Third, since the acceptance of the ‘social agreement’ is a precondition for the return and does 
not give the IDPs any other choice in order to return to their homes, this agreement embodies 
an extreme case of blackmailing the people of North Waziristan. In brief, if they do not agree 
to cooperate in counter-terrorism or fail in keeping the militants out of North Waziristan, the 
people have to face severe consequences (from individual to collective punishments) like 
losing national identity cards, passports, visa - even their property can be taken away or they 
could be banned from the area.  
 
Fourth, the ‘social agreement’ gives the false impression that the local people are responsible 
for their homeland turning into a sanctuary for domestic and foreign militants. Because of the 
allegedly close cooperation between tribes and terrorists, the situation spiraled out of control. 
However, this accusation is a severe distortion of facts, since terrorist groups like the Haqqani 
network or Taliban were without any doubt operating in the region with the blessing of the 
country’s army and intelligence. In this context, one must recall that the government itself 
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allowed anti-state actors like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to stay in the area by 
signing numerous so called ‘peace deals’, at least 11. Furthermore, it is obvious that Pakistani 
state agencies helped to facilitate foreign financial support, especially from Saudi Arabia, for 
terrorist organization operating in FATA. 
 
Last but not least, the controversial agreement provoked much critic among the tribes and 
their elders regarding the approval or rejection of the document. Subsequently many of them 
interpreted the agreement as an attempt of the political administration to divide and silence 
the tribal people in order to gain more leverage among them.  
 
Conclusion 
Islamabad lonce again let a window of opportunity to improve governance and socio-
economic conditions in a part of the country’s ‘periphery’ close in front of their eyes. Instead 
of using the post-war scenario after a large scale military operation and a more or less 
stalemate for the introduction of sufficient democratic reforms, Islamabad decided to continue 
its repressive policy inherited by the colonial rulers to protect its partisan interests. This is a 
phenomenon, which not only set the FATA in general and North Waziristan in particular apart 
from the rest of Pakistan, but also made the region one of the country’s most underdeveloped 
and unsafe regions. By having said this, the unwarranted agreement symbolises the lack of 
political will and incompetence of Pakistan’s national elite to work out a fair mechanism of 
decision making and distribution of national resources. Instead the latest use of coercive force 
by the state as well as the Jihadists is further alienating the affected tribesmen from the central 
state authorities. In sum, the need of the hour is to finally address the grievances of the tribal 
populace. More concrete, to reconstruct their homes and other properties destroyed in military 
operations, integrate them into the social and economic national mainstream, enhance their 
political participation by granting them full political rights and citizenship, as well as the 
removal of restrictive laws originating from colonial times.  
 
Beyond any question, this must be done by Islamabad without any condition (besides insisting 
on the regular obligations of a Pakistan citizen) attached to the tribesmen. Furthermore, the 
country’s decision makers have to understand that enforcing discriminating laws like FCR is 
not feasible any more in order to maintain Islamabad’s grip over the region. Not only because 
of the increasing entrenchment of Islamist power in FATA but also due to the fact that the 
local people are exhausted of being misused as a strategic asset in Pakistan’s foreign and 
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security policy in general and in its Afghanistan approach in particular. Subsequently, 
Pakistan’s establishment has to reassess its notion of ‘social’ as well as stop questioning the 
loyalty of tribesmen. Furthermore, the approach must be changed from demanding all kinds of 
guarantees from the people in the region, threatening them with harsh consequences and 
imposing a draconian system of regulations but offering nothing substantial in return. Before 
the state questions the loyalty of tribesmen, seeking various forms of guarantees from them 
and threatening them with dire consequences, Islamabad should engage in some serious 
introspection to understand its own role in creating and then aggravating the conflict in North 
Wazistan/FATA. If this is will not happen, the ‘social agreement’ remains ‘asocial’ and 
instills further mistrust into the faith and loyalty of the tribal people towards the state. 
Otherwise, Pakistan will experience a continuation of armed struggles and enhance the 
transformation of North Waziristan into Jihadist ‘no-man’s land’. 
 
 
